

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

WE/FI

NO.

OELA-5323

DATE

2 March 1954

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. WE/FI			2 Mar-2	SM CP	HAND CARRY KAPOK (any kapok carding to be handled by SE.)
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3. WE/G			2 Mar-2	SM CP	
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for KAPOK file

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VIA: AIR POUCH

DISPATCH NO. OELA-5323

K A P O K

18 February 1954

TO: []

FROM: Chief []

SUBJECT: GENERAL - SHAM/OBOPUS

SPECIFIC - Transmittal of Review

REFERENCE: OELA-5101

1. Enclosed herewith is a copy of the Review of VALUABLE Activities for the year 1953 received from AIRCERT.

2. AIRCERT requested that [] not forward a copy of this review to Rome due to the fact that AIRCERT felt most of it was not of interest to [] and for security reasons should not go to that place. [] is therefore complying with AIRCERT's wishes in this matter although after review of the document, [] believes AIRCERT is being overly concerned about the sensitivity of the report in question.

Enclosure (s.c.)

Distribution:

[]s - 3 with 1 enc. (Attn: [])
WE - 3 without enc.
SE - 3 with 1 enc. ✓
[] - 1 without enc. (Attn: [])
Registry
Files

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SECRET

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Review of 'VALUABLE' Activities for the year 1953

A. Directive for 1953

In early 1953 S.I.S. was invited by the Foreign Office, to carry out the following action with regard to Albania in 1953:

(i) To continue intelligence operations into Albania, in accordance with the general priorities of defence intelligence drawn up by the J.I.C.

(ii) To continue support of the National Committee for a free Albania in collaboration with C.I.A.

(iii) To carry out periodic leaflet raids on the scale of approximately one every three months (these raids to be carried out by the R.A.F. and the aircraft not to approach nearer than 15 n-miles to known A.A. gun defended areas).

B. IMPLEMENTATION

Intelligence

1. Three penetration operations were originally planned for 1953, but agent difficulties and a domestic decision not to infiltrate VALUABLE agents by sea, resulted in our recruiting and training only two teams, a projected operation to the VALONA area being abandoned. Of the two teams trained, LUCID, a party of 5 men carrying W/T, was infiltrated overland from Greece in July with brief to establish themselves in the TIRANA area and exploit their local contacts for intelligence purposes. In the event, the leader of LUCID proved unsuitable to fulfill his mission and the team returned to Greece after spending only 10 days in Albania. The party was, however, reconstituted under a new leader and as LUCID II returned to Albania with a similar objective and brief in August. Subsequent news of this party has been very meagre, but there are indications that they carried out their mission to some extent and are now in Yugoslavia. We are trying to obtain the full story.

2. We planned to infiltrate our other trained team, also equipped with W/T, into Northern Albania to establish themselves and contact potential informants and resistance elements still surviving in that area. We were, however, at the last moment unable to launch this operation owing to other claims on the use of our special aircraft (land infiltration from Greece is not a practical proposition for Northern Albania in the eyes of penetration agents). This team has consequently been put into reserve for 1954 operations.

3. One further operation into Albania was undertaken by a lone agent. He was, however, only able to work for a short time in East Central Albania before winter set in. The intelligence dividend was very small.

4. A defector-inducement operation against an official in The TIRANA Ministry of Foreign Trade was carried out by letters posted inside Albania, but no success resulted.

5. In the course of 1953 several Albanian refugees sought asylum in Austria after spending some time in Yugoslavia and we made arrangements for their interrogation. Apart from their information on Albania, these refugees provided comprehensive intelligence on the U.D.B.-dominated Prizren Committee of Albanian emigres in Yugoslavia which was well received by the Foreign Office.

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6. Concentration on merchant shipping as a means of penetrating Albania resulted in some coverage of the ports of DURAZZO and VALONA and an increased flow of statistical intelligence concerning cargoes handled by these two ports.

C. Support of N.C.F.A.

1. A liaison officer was stationed in Rome throughout 1953 and together with his C.I.A. colleague maintained almost daily contact with the Albanian emigre leaders.
2. A number of written articles, press cuttings and photographs have been provided for inclusion in the official N.C.F.A. newspaper "SHQIPERIA" which has continued to appear regularly twice a month.
3. Assistance has been given to members of the N.C.F.A. to attend international gatherings such as the meetings of Free Lawyers in Berlin and the U.N. Commission on Slave Labour in Geneva and provide evidence of conditions inside Albania.
4. Efforts were made to bring the N.C.F.A. and the rival Yugoslav-run Prisren Committee into contact with a view to strengthening the Albanian emigration as a whole, but we met with only limited success before the TRIESTE crisis caused us to shelve our plans for the time being.
5. At a meeting with C.I.A. in London in October both VALUABLE and FRIEND agreed that a reorganisation of the Committee must be undertaken both to widen its appeal within the country and among the emigration and to infuse new life into the Committee which, in five years of its existence, had split into two groups more concerned with opposing each other than focusing their attention on the task of liberating their country. In addition, C.I.A. were required to reduce expenditure on the N.C.F.A. which they entirely finance.
6. As a result, the Committee has been broadened to include adherents of two political factions not hitherto represented, but some members of the old Committee have declined for not altogether honest motives to serve on the reorganised N.C.F.A. We are not at present unduly worried by this development and are hopeful of finding in the new Committee an improved front organisation.

D. PROPAGANDA.

1. In conformity with our directive, four leaflet scattering raids were successfully carried out over Albania during 1953. In the course of these sorties a total of 2,555,000 leaflets were dropped over the main towns and roads throughout the country, in the case of AA. defended towns advantages being taken of the wind to allow the leaflets to reach their objectives. The first of these raids (in March) was carried out by the R.A.F., but for the subsequent three, use was made, with Foreign Office approval, of our sterile aircraft. No serious opposition was encountered on any occasion.
2. The contents of the leaflets (which are attributed to the N.C.F.A.) were designed to keep the spirit of resistance alive and to report Communist set-backs in Eastern Europe likely to have repercussions in Albania. In late November we dropped a special text reminding Albanians of their pre-war National Day which falls on 28th November, but is not recognised by the present regime.

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3. Experiments made during 1953 have shown that we can now despatch far more leaflets per raid than hitherto, and could comfortably drop 2 million at a time in future.

4. No action was taken during the year to drop the useful articles such as razor blades and needles with N.C.F.A. tags attached which we have had in store from the time of projected operations of this sort in 1952 when C.I.A. asked us to hold our hands at the request of the Department of State. (The Americans were accused by TIRANA Radio in 1952 of spreading bacteriological warfare to Europe when they dropped flour into Albania.) C.I.A. have now, however, received authority from the Department of State to resume articles and food drops, and in late 1953 FIEND dropped some articles during flights made primarily for other purposes. They intend to continue such operations at least until their present stocks are exhausted.

5. Throughout 1953 we gave our advice to FIEND concerning programmes produced by them for the clandestine radio "The Voice of Free Albania", which is beamed to Albania from Greece.

E. CONCLUSIONS

1. We have satisfactorily fulfilled points (ii) and (iii) of our directive. We hope in the future, as a result of our re-organisation of the N.C.F.A., to be able to work through a more efficient and representative body. We are also now in a position to drop a greater quantity of leaflets during our raids and to saturate particular areas if such action is required.

2. In the intelligence field, our penetration operations (mainly through lack of technical means of infiltration given the low priority of the Albanian target) did not prosper as we had hoped, and the intelligence yield has been poor. We have, however, tapped other sources of information on Albania not previously tackled and have hopes of maintaining, through this coverage, the encouraging initial results achieved.

3. Our meeting in London with FIEND in October enabled us jointly to review our Albanian activities. We found that the two Services were very close together in their thinking on the problems involved, but that C.I.A. were committed to a rather more forward policy aimed at detaching Albania from the Soviet block and that they consequently proposed to undertake rather more propaganda action in 1954. They did not, however, envisage attempting to solve the problem by para-military means.

4. Our appreciation of the situation inside Albania resulting from our work in 1953 does not differ in any material degree from the thoughts expressed in our Review of a year ago. While active resistance to the Communist regime remains sporadic (we have received independent reports of small centres of resistance activity only from Northern Albania) we believe that the spirit of resistance and faith in the N.C.F.A. remain alive, though the vast majority of Albanians are quite unwilling to take any action which might bring reprisals on their heads. The aim of considerable Yugoslav agent and propaganda activity in Albania remains obscure, but seems concerned with the winning of the TIRANA regime over to TITO Communism.

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